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1 Introduction 
There is an increasing recognition of the critical role rising household debt plays as a cause of 
financial crises (Bezemer et al. 2016; Bezemer & Grydaki 2014; Schularick & Taylor 2012; 
Mian & Sufi 2009). However there is still relatively little systematic empirical research on 
the reasons for the spectacular rise of household debt in the last decades. In the nascent 
debate several factors have featured prominently.  
First, as rising income inequality has been documented (Atkinson et al. 2011; Piketty 2014), 
inequality has gained prominence in explaining rising household debt. Kumhof et al. (2012) 
have proposed a two-class DSGE model where poor households are pushed into debt as they 
are trying to maintain their consumption levels. Several authors (Frank et al. 2014; Kapeller 
& Schütz 2014; Ryoo & Kim 2014; Behringer & Treeck 2013) have argued that rapidly 
growing top incomes lead to rising household debt if consumers follow social norms and 
imitate the lifestyle and expenses of richer peers. This latter argument is based on a 
behavioural economics approach, in particular other-regarding social norms for which there 
exists empirical support especially in the context of consumption and saving (Alvarez-
Cuadrado & Japaridze 2017; Kim et al. 2015; Drechsel-Grau & Schmid 2014). We will refer 
to this as the expenditure cascades hypothesis (ECH) of household debt. 
Second, rising real estate prices are another explanation for rising household debt. Most 
household debt is, in fact, mortgage debt. Jordà et al. (2016) document the rising importance 
of mortgage debt and highlight its link to real estate prices with historic macroeconomic data. 
Borio (2014), Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) and Leamer (2007) identify property prices as 
one of the key variables for financial and business cycles. Ryoo (2016) presents a formal 
Minsky model where household debt is driven by property prices. Bezemer et al. (2017) 
document in a new panel covering 74 countries that mortgages where the primary driver of 
household credit over their 1990-2011 sample period. However while there is an extensive 
literature on the effects of property prices or housing wealth on consumption expenditures, 
(see the surveys by Cooper and Dynan (2016) and Paiella (2009)), there is much less on their 
effects on household debt. This paper refers to this argument as the housing boom hypothesis 
(HBH): home buyers take out larger mortgages relative to their income in the face of rapidly 
rising house prices.   
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Third, the influence of monetary policy on household borrowing decisions works via interest 
rates. If central banks keep interest rates at very low levels, cheap (mortgage) rates will 
attract borrowers who may struggle with their repayments when interest rates increase. This 
explanation is called the low interest rate hypothesis (LIH). Taylor (2009) has prominently 
argued that the failure of the US central bank to increase interest rates1 in the early 2000s has 
been a main cause of the financial crisis and an over indebted household sector. Sinn and 
Valentinyi (2013) have made a similar argument for Europe and claim that European 
monetary unification has led to low interest rates in southern Europe, which resulted in a debt 
boom.  
Fourth, financial deregulation and financial innovation may be behind the rise in household 
debt. If the financial sector becomes more risk seeking and its willingness to lend increases, 
households will be able to take on more debt. In particular for the USA, increasing 
securitization and the rise of the originate-to-distribute model of banking have been cited as 
causes of the crisis (Crotty 2009; Purnanandam 2011). More generally, if financial 
regulations are lifted this can boost credit supply and lead to increased household borrowing. 
We will refer to this explanation as the financial deregulation hypothesis (FDH) (Borio 2014; 
Borio & White 2004; Mian & Sufi 2009; Justiniano et al. 2015).  
The contribution of this paper is to assess these hypotheses empirically. We are particularly 
interested in their ability to explain the increase in household debt prior to 2008.2 In order to 
do so a household debt equation is estimated for a panel of 11 OECD countries for the period 
1980-2011. The existing literature on the determinants of household debt is rather thin and 
typically only considers some of these hypotheses in isolation. Perugini et al. (2016) is an 
important exception as they control for three of the four hypotheses investigated in this paper. 
However their paper does not distinguish between household and business debt and it does 
not take property prices into account. Bordo and Meissner (2012), and, similar, if critical, Gu 
and Huang (2014) investigate the effect of inequality on debt over a long period (1920-2008), 
but do not control for real estate prices or financial regulation. Also none of these studies 
allows or tests for potential long run relationships. Thus the existing literature lacks a 
                                                 
1 In contrast Bernanke (2005) argues low interest rates are due to non-policy factors, in particular Chinese 
capital exports. 
2 The focus of this paper lies on the first three hypotheses. We have less confidence in the financial deregulation 
hypothesis because, firstly, due to data availability, we only account for financial regulation, but not for 
financial innovation and, secondly, financial regulation may work with longer time lags than the other variables 
in our model.  
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comprehensive empirical study. Assessing the explanatory power of these hypotheses is not 
only interesting from a theoretical perspective, but also for economic policy because they 
have very different policy implications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarises the theoretical arguments 
involved and distils the key hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the relevant empirical literature on 
the determinants of household debt. Section 4 discusses the data sources and the econometric 
method. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes.  
2 Explanations of rising Household Debt  
While the effects of household debt have recently attracted interest, there is comparatively 
less research on the determinants of household debt. In this paper we distinguish between 
approaches that derive debt from asset transactions, those that derive it from consumption 
decisions and those that highlight economic policy and regulations. Explanations of 
household debt accumulation, which emphasize asset transactions and real estate transactions 
in particular, are summarised under the label ‘housing boom hypothesis’ (HBH). Different 
authors propose different links between house prices and household indebtedness. First, New 
Keynesian3 authors (Iacoviello 2005) argue that rising residential real estate prices can ease 
binding credit constraints and thus have the potential to boost household borrowing. If banks 
primarily consider collateral values when they grant loans, this can be an important channel 
through which rising real estate prices drive up household debt. In the New Keynesian 
framework binding credit constraints imply that even transitory increases in property prices 
will lead to increased household borrowing. Second, in Post Keynesian4 stock flow consistent 
(SFC) models (Godley & Lavoie 2007; Zezza 2008; Nikolaidi 2015) household behaviour is 
anchored by so-called stock-flow norms. Assuming that consumption depends on disposable 
income and some measure of wealth, households will attempt to reach a target wealth-to-
income ratio (Godley and Lavoie 2007, p.75). If property prices rise and household sector 
wealth increases beyond the target ratio, households will consume that ‘excess wealth’ by 
taking on debt if they cannot or do not want to sell their assets. Third, residential real estate 
prices increasing faster than disposable income, will lead to households taking out bigger 
mortgages relative to their income, if they are not willing to postpone their home purchases. 
                                                 
3 We use the term “New Keynesian” to refer to micro founded models which incorporate several market 
frictions such as sticky prices, credit constraints or information asymmetries. 
4 The label “Post Keynesian” refers to aggregated macroeconomic models which emphasize the role of effective 
demand and are not based on rational optimization as the decision making process. 
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This argument implicitly assumes that households are not perfectly foresighted, rational 
decision makers but are either myopic or follow rules of thumb. All three arguments imply 
that rising property prices encourage household borrowing and are summarised as the 
housing boom hypothesis.  
Regarding household expenditures, behavioural economics stresses that household 
preferences may be interdependent. People’s wellbeing and behaviour is influence by the 
behaviour of peers. Building on Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), Frank (1985) and 
Frank et al. (2014) emphasize that households do not only spend in order to fulfil their needs 
but also to signal status. They argue that households’ expenditures not only depend on own 
income but also on the expenditures of other households. In particular Frank et al. (2014) 
argue that households compare themselves with peers who are richer than themselves, i.e. 
people look up the distribution of income when assessing their status. In times of growing top 
incomes, those households in the bracket just below the top group will be trying to keep up 
with the richer top group and take on debt in order to finance their status comparison-induced 
expenditures. Households in the third income bracket will run into debt when they try to keep 
up with those in the second bracket etc.. The result is a cascade of debt-financed status 
expenditures flowing downwards from the top of the income distribution; thus we use the 
term expenditure cascades hypothesis (ECH). Several authors have incorporated these 
assumptions in Post Keynesian macroeconomic models (Belabed et al. 2013; Kapeller & 
Schütz 2014; Ryoo & Kim 2014; Cardaci 2014). A similar explanation of increased 
household borrowing posits that households (building on prospect theory) do not want to 
reduce consumption below levels reached in the past or below a minimum level. Kumhof and 
Ranciere (2010) adopt the latter approach and show that a decline in bargaining power of 
workers leads to increased income inequality and results in a debt-financed attempt to 
maintain living standards. While similar to ECH in terms of the prediction that higher 
inequality may lead to higher consumption Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) is based on self-
regarding (rather than upward-looking) preferences and stagnant income for the lower group.  
There are several authors who regard the changes to the regulatory framework of the financial 
industry over the last two decades as the key factor in explaining rising household debt levels 
(Crotty 2009; Mian & Sufi 2009; Rajan 2010).5 We refer to this as the financial deregulation 
                                                 
5 It is important to point out that for Rajan (2010) financial deregulation and easing of credit constraints is the 
result of political pressure due to increased income inequality. 
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hypothesis (FDH). In particular the shift from a traditional originate and hold to an originate 
and distribute model of banking, where banks sell off their loans in the form of asset backed 
mortgage securities is blamed for over accumulation of debt in the household sector (Mian & 
Sufi 2009). This switch has led to declining lending standards because the risks associated 
with issuing mortgages to low quality borrowers could be quickly removed from the issuing 
institution’s balance sheets. This gave low quality debtors who were previously excluded 
access to the mortgage market. In addition, households which already had a mortgage, were 
able to take out larger ones relative to their disposable income. Both effects led to higher 
aggregate debt levels. Another policy-related argument is that low interest rates, especially 
after the dot-com bubble in the US, encouraged households to take on unsustainable debt 
loads. We will refer to this explanation as the low interest rate hypothesis (LIH). Taylor 
(2009) is a prominent proponent of the LIH for the US case. He argues that central banks and 
the Fed in particular kept interest rates too low for too long and effectively failed to follow a 
rule-based policy approach which he proposes. For Europe Sinn (2014) argues that common 
monetary policy resulted in low interest rates for southern European countries which 
encouraged debt-fuelled bubbles. Interest rate discrepancies were exacerbated by private 
investors’ disregard for country-specific default risk. The LIH is at its core a theory of 
government failure, unlike ECH and HBH, which are about private sector mechanisms. 
To investigate these arguments the paper estimates a debt accumulation function which 
models the stock of household sector debt as a function of disposable income (𝑌𝐷), property 
price indices (𝑃𝑃), a measure of income inequality (𝑄), a real interest rate (𝑅), the population 
share older than 65 (𝑂𝐿𝐷) and a credit regulation index (𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷): 
𝐷 = 𝑑(𝑌𝐷 , 𝑃𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑅, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷, 𝑂𝐿𝐷)    (1) 
According to the ECH households engage in debt-financed spending in an attempt to emulate 
the social status of richer peers. Thus household borrowing increases with income inequality: 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑄
> 0. According to the HBH, changes in debt are driven by asset transactions and 
collateral-backed borrowing due to wealth-effects. Here the key driving variable are property 
prices: 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑃𝑃
> 0. The FDH argues that credit market deregulation allowed financial 
institutions to increase lending, which enabled households to take out larger mortgages 
relative to their disposable income and also gave previously excluded households access to 
the mortgage market. Thus credit market deregulation drives up household borrowing: 
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𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷
> 0. Finally, according to the LIH low real interest rates have encouraged households 
to take on debt at unsustainable rates: 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑅
< 0. Table 1 summarises these hypotheses. 
Table 1. Hypotheses on debt determinants  
 Hypothesis Theoretical Argument Predicted signs 
 1 
expenditure cascades 
hypothesis (ECH) 
Households make consumption 
decisions with respect to richer 
peers. Consumption decisions drive 
debt 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑄
> 0   
2 
housing boom 
hypothesis (HBH) 
Debt is driven by asset transactions 
and wealth effects. Rising asset 
prices lead to higher debt and 
higher spending. 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑃𝑃
> 0    
3 
financial 
deregulation 
hypothesis (FDH) 
Deregulation of the financial 
industry lifts lending restrictions 
and allows households to take on 
more debt. 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷
> 0  
4 
low interest rate 
hypothesis (LIH) 
Loose monetary policy in the form 
of low interest rates encourages 
household borrowing. 
𝜕𝐷
𝜕𝑅
< 0  
𝐷 is household debt, 𝑄 is a measure of income inequality, 𝐶 is a measure of aggregate consumption, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 
stands for credit regulation, 𝑅 is a real interest rate and 𝑃𝑃 indicates property prices. 
The way we have specified the partial effects implicitly assumes that they work in the 
upswing as well as in the downswing of the business cycle. However there are reasons why 
this symmetry may not hold in practice. Most importantly, it is easier for households to 
accumulate debt during a boom than to deleverage in particular in a recession with falling 
incomes. We will thus also investigate whether there is evidence for asymmetric adjustment.  
3 The Empirical Literature 
The Financial Crisis triggered by the collapse of the US mortgage market has motivated a 
wave of empirical studies which look at the relationship between the trend of rising income 
inequality and household indebtedness (Klein 2015; Perugini et al. 2016; Gu & Huang 2014; 
Malinen 2014; Behringer & Treeck 2013; Bordo & Meissner 2012; Kumhof et al. 2012). 
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Most of these studies are motivated by the theoretical work of Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and 
Rancière (2010) and do not estimate theory-derived structural models but rely on ad hoc 
specifications instead. For example Perugini et al. (2016) apply a dynamic system GMM 
estimator to a panel of 18 OECD countries from 1970 and 2007. They find a positive impact 
of top income shares on private sector debt. Gu and Huang (2014) and Bordo and Meissner 
(2012) in contrast use long data series going back to the 1920s and the logarithmized 
difference of real private sector debt as their dependent variable. The latter do not find a 
positive impact of top income shares whereas the former do claim to find such a relationship 
but it hinges on interacting the inequality measure with GDP growth.  
Table 2: Effects of income distribution on household debt 
authors specification country findings 
Behringer 
and van 
Treeck 2013 
CA=f(Top1/Gini, 
NFA, govB, rel. Y, 
old, n, PC,); also use 
HFB and S instead of 
CA 
annual data, G7, 
1972-2007 
top income shares and Gini coefficients 
have negative effects on dep. vars. 
Bordo and 
Meissner 
2012 
DBP=f(Top1, R, GDP, 
I, M) 
 
annual data, 14 
OECD countries, 
1920-2008 
no statistically significant effect of top 
1% income shares on dep. var. and 
negative interest rate effect 
Gu and 
Huang 2014 
DBP=f(Top1,R,GDPc, 
Iy,M) 
 
annual data, 14 
OECD countries, 
1920-2008 
statistically significant positive effect 
of top 1% income shares on dep. var. if 
interacted with GDP growth and pos. 
interest rate effect 
Klein 2015 CPH=f(Top1, Gini, 
wage share), 
 
annual data, 9 
OECD countries, 
1953-2008 
statistically significant positive effect 
of top 1% income share, Gini 
coefficient, wage share 
Kumhof et 
al. 2012 
CA=f(Top1, youth, 
old, trade, PC, rel. Y, 
g, govB, NFA), 
annual data, 18 
OECD countries, 
1968-2006 
statistically significant negative effect 
of top income shares on current 
account,  
Malinen 
2014 
DBP=f(Top1, GDPc, 
Iy, M, R), 
 
annual data, 8 
OECD countries, 
1960-2008 
statistically significant positive effect 
of top 1% income shares on dep. var. 
Perugini et 
al. 2016 
DCP=f(Top1, R, FD, 
My, GDPc, g, Iy, PI), 
 
annual data, 18 
OECD countries, 
1970-2007 
statistically significant positive effects 
of top 1% / 5% / 10% income shares on 
dep. var. and no interest rate effect, 
positive deregulation effect 
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CA stands for current account balance in % of GDP, HFB is the household sector financial balance in % of 
GDP, S is the household sector saving rate, DBP is real domestic bank loans to the private sector from the 
Schularick and Taylor (2012) data set., CPH is real credit to household sector per capita, DCP is domestic 
credit to the private sector in % of GDP, Top1 is the top 1% income share, R stands for interest rates, g for real 
GDP growth, GDP(c) is real GDP (per capita), I(y) is investment (in % of GDP), NFA is stock of net foreign 
assets in % of GDP, M(y) is M2 (relative to GDP), PI is portfolio investment in % of GDP, youth and old are 
the shares of under 15 and over 65 year olds, trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods in % of GDP, PC 
is private credit in % of GDP, rel. Y is per capita income in PPPs relative to the US, govB is the general 
government fiscal balance  and FD are financial deregulation proxies. 
Only Perugini et al. (2016) make an attempt to control for credit supply conditions and find a 
positive effect of the credit market deregulation index supplied by the Fraser Institute. When 
it comes to the effects of interest rates, results are mixed. Perugini et al. (2016) find no 
statistically significant effect, Bordo and Meissner (2012) find a statistically significant 
negative effect and Gu and Huang (2014) report a statistically significant positive effect.  
Klein (2015) and Malinen (2014) are motivated by previous empirical studies and the lack of 
cointegration tests therein. Both investigate bivariate cointegration relationships between 
household debt (Klein 2015) or bank credit to the private sector (Malinen 2014) and top 
income shares. They find that debt and income inequality are cointegrated. Klein (2015) 
estimates the cointegrating vector in a strictly bivariate model whereas Malinen (2014) 
controls for short run fluctuations in GDP, investment and the money stock M2. A key 
shortcoming of this approach is that it almost surely suffers from omitted variable bias since 
inequality is not the only factor driving household or private debt. We aim to address this 
problem in this paper by going beyond bivariate models. 
Behringer and van Treeck (2013) and Kumhof et al. (2012) do not investigate the 
determinants of private sector or household debt but focus on the current account balance in 
% of GDP instead. They argue that if households engage in debt-financed expenditure 
cascades due to upward-looking status comparison, then household net-lending will decrease 
and given the corporate and public sector balance the current account will deteriorate. Thus 
they estimate a model with the current account as dependent variable and top income shares 
as their preferred measure of income inequality. A negative effect of top income shares on the 
current account balance is interpreted as inequality induced spending and evidence in favour 
of the expenditure cascades hypothesis. Both studies report negative effects of top income 
shares but do not control for credit market supply shifts or interest rates. Table 2 summarizes 
the empirical literature investigating the effects of shifts in the distribution of income on 
household borrowing.  
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It is important to emphasize a common characteristic which all of the papers discussed so fare 
share: They do not include real estate prices in their analysis. This is interesting because there 
is a large time series literature which consistently finds a positive link between property 
prices and household sector borrowing6. However at the same time the property price 
literature ignores the swings in the distribution of income as a relevant factor. This paper is 
an attempt to bring these two branches of the literature on household debt together. 
The number of studies using panel data for investigating the impact of property prices on 
household borrowing is small compared to the number of time series papers on the topic. 
Égert et al. (2006) estimate the determinants of credit to the private sector over GDP in order 
to assess whether debt levels in central and eastern European countries are in line with long 
run equilibrium estimates. They use simple fixed effects models as well as the mean group 
estimator (Pesaran et al. 1999) and dynamic OLS and find a significant and positive effect of 
house prices on private credit. They also include the spread between lending and deposit rates 
as a proxy for competition within the banking sector but it remains statistically insignificant 
as long as house prices are included in the regression. They find positive as well as negative 
interest rate effects varying across samples and estimation methods.  
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) estimate a panel VAR based on a sample of quarterly data 
from 1970-2006 of 17 OECD countries. The VAR includes nominal bank credit to the private 
sector, nominal house prices, real GDP, the CPI, nominal interest rates and the money 
aggregate M3. Based on Granger causality testing and a simple Cholesky decomposition 
(ordering: GDP, CPI, interest rate, property prices, money, private credit) they find 
multidirectional links between these variables. They that house prices positively influence 
private credit and money. They also find a lasting negative impact of higher interest rates. In 
order to account for shifts in the regulatory framework of credit markets they re-estimate the 
model on the shorter period 1986-2006 and find particularly strong effects of house prices.  
Rubaszek and Serwa (2014) build a theoretical model of household borrowing and compare it 
with single equation cointegration estimations based on a panel of 36 countries. They use 
                                                 
6 In the time series literature most authors (Oikarinen 2009; Anundsen & Jansen 2013; Meng et al. 2013) use 
broad measures of household sector borrowing and report a statistically significant, positive long-run impact of 
property prices on borrowing. In contrast Gimeno and Martinez-Carrascal (2010) restrict their analysis of 
property price effects in Spain to housing secured debt only and Chrystal and Mizen (2005) look at wealth 
effects on unsecured borrowing in the UK. Lastly, Arestis and Gonzalez (2014) and Hofman (2004) analyse the 
impact of property prices on private credit in OECD countries.  
10 
 
household borrowing relative to GDP as their explanatory variable and find a positive long 
run impact of house prices on household borrowing as well as a positive real interest rate 
effect. The spread between lending and deposit rates is used as a measure of banking sector 
competition. Table 3 summarizes the literature investigating the nexus between real estate 
prices and household borrowing. 
 
Table 3: Effects of property prices on household debt 
Authors specification Country findings 
Egert et al. 
2006 
PC=f(GDPc, 
BCgov, R, CPI, PP, 
FD, reg) 
annual panel data 
43 countries, 1975-
2004 
find a significant and positive effect 
of nominal house prices on private 
credit, no consistent finding with 
respect to interest rates  
Goodhart and 
Hofmann 2008 
panel VAR 
including: BCP, 
GDP, CPI, R, PP, 
M2) 
17 OECD countries, 
1970-2006, 
quarterly data 
interdependency between nominal 
house prices and household 
borrowing, statistically significant 
negative interest rate effect  
Rubaszek and 
Serwa 2014 
HL=f(GDP, R, 
GDPc, u, PP, 
longU) 
36 countries, 1995-
2009 
positive and highly statistical 
significant effect of real property 
prices on borrowing and positive 
interest rate effect 
PC stands for private credit in % of GDP, GDPc is GDP per capita, BCgov is bank credit to the government 
sector in % of GDP, R stands for interest rates, CPI represents an inflation measures, PP is a property price 
index, FD stands for financial deregulation proxies, reg is an indicator variable for public and private land 
registries, BCP is bank credit to the private sector, M2 is a money supply measure, HL is household credit in % 
of GDP, u is the unemployment rate and longU is the share of long term unemployed.  
In addition to papers emphasizing distributional shifts and property prices as drivers of 
household debt, there is a literature which focuses on the impact of shifts in credit supply 
conditions and the deregulation of financial markets. However this literature hardly uses 
macroeconomic panel data and is therefore not directly comparable to this paper. Mian and 
Sufi (2009) for example use a ZIP code based panel data set of household borrowing 
information and argue that debt increased most in those areas where large proportions of the 
mortgage pool were securitized. They interpret this as evidence that in the US changes in the 
behaviour of financial institutions were key in enabling household debt accumulation. Jordà 
et al. (2015) use newly constructed long series of mortgage debt and assess the role of loose 
monetary conditions, measured by interest rates, for household borrowing and house prices. 
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Their conclusion is that especially in the post war era low interest rates strongly contributed 
to residential property booms and as a result mortgage debt booms.   
Five general patterns emerge from the empirical literature on the determinants of household 
and private sector borrowing: First, most studies do not distinguish between the household 
and the corporate sector. In contrast we explicitly use a measure of household sector 
borrowing instead of credit to the private sector. This is important because the channels 
influencing household and corporate borrowing are quite different and this paper is only 
interested in the former group. Second, there is a lack of studies which investigate the impact 
of income inequality and property prices on household borrowing simultaneously, although 
there is very robust empirical evidence backing the theoretical prediction of wealth effects. 
Starting to fill this gap is one of the main contributions of this paper. Third, most papers do 
rely on short run analysis of differenced data. If cointegration analysis is applied a bivariate 
relationship is tested. This paper aims to go beyond bivariate cointegration testing and thus 
avoid potentially serious omitted variable bias. Fourth, little attention is paid to the role of 
shifts in credit supply conditions. The most important reason is the inherent difficulty for 
measuring such shifts besides very broad measures such as debt-to-GDP ratios. Fifth, 
findings with respect to interest rate effects vary and are not consistent across studies and 
sometimes not even within studies. 
4 Data and Econometric Method 
Our dataset is an unbalanced annual panel covering 11 countries from 1980 to 20117. 
Definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix (Table A1) as well as descriptive 
statistics (Table A2).  
Real residential property price indices are used as proxies for housing wealth of the 
household sector, because wealth data are not available (for sufficiently long time periods) 
for most countries. This is common in the literature estimating wealth effects.8 The drawback 
is that price indices capture quantity changes only indirectly. We use two different measures 
of the distribution of income. The share of total income which is received by the richest 1% 
of households (𝑇𝑂𝑃1) captures the dynamics at the top of the distribution. Since the 
expenditure cascades hypothesis predicts debt-financed spending sprees to be triggered by 
                                                 
7 The countries included are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and the US. 
8 See Paiella (2009), Attanasio  and Weber (2010) and Cooper and Dynan (2016) for recent surveys. 
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concentration of income at the top this is our preferred measure for testing that hypothesis. In 
addition we use a Gini coefficient which is directly computed from income data (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼). The 
Gini index is less sensitive to distributional changes at the top.  
Although shifts in credit supply conditions are important determinants of household 
borrowing, measuring the state of credit supply and the willingness to lend by financial 
institutions is difficult. One approach in the literature focuses entirely on credit regulations 
and financial reforms and argues that a less regulated financial sector should be expected to 
enhance borrowing. Indices based on the existence of interest rate controls, the relation of 
public to private borrowing, entry barriers to the financial sector and the existence of capital 
account restrictions are derived and used in empirical analysis. A widely used index 
following such an approach is the Fraser Index on credit regulation. A different approach 
aims to capture shifts in banks’ willingness to lend due to changes in the sector’s risk appetite 
(Fernandez-Corugedo & Muellbauer 2006).9 In this paper we will use the Fraser Index 
because credit supply indices in the spirit of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) are 
not available for the countries of our panel in a consistent form. A shortcoming of the Fraser 
index is that it does not capture shifts in the risk appetite of the financial sector. It also does 
not capture those changes to the regulatory framework which turned out to be key for the pre-
crisis period: the use of off-balance sheet vehicles, increased proprietary trading and low 
capital requirements for assets in the trading book. 
We specify our debt accumulation equation as an error correction (EC) model:  
∆𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑡∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
11
𝑝=0 +⋯+ ∑ 𝛽6𝑡∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
61
𝑝=0 − 𝛾𝑖(𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝑋𝑖,𝑡
1 +⋯+ 𝜃6𝑋𝑖,𝑡
6 ) +
𝜇𝑖𝑡 (2) 
The dependent variable 𝑍 is our measure of total household sector liabilities in billion of local 
currency (log⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑡)) and (𝑋
1, …⁡ , 𝑋6) are vectors of real disposable household income in 
billion of local currency (log⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐷)), the income share of the richest 1% of households 
(𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑖𝑡), alternatively we also use a Gini coefficient (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡) of income inequality. 
Furthermore we use real property price indices (log⁡(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡)), the real long term interest rate 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡), the ratio of people older than 65 in the population (𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡) and the credit market 
                                                 
9 Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) estimate a common trend in  the volume of mortgages and 
unsecured debt and in the fraction of high loan-to-value and loan-to-income borrowers in the UK. They interpret 
this common trend as a credit conditions index. 
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regulation index published by the Fraser Institute (log⁡(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡)) (subcategory 5A of the 
Economic Freedom of the World index). Monetary variables and the interest rate are deflated 
by the consumer price index.  
The key advantage of EC or autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models is that they allow 
for I(0) as well as I(1) variables and require no prior knowledge of the order of integration 
(Pesaran & Shin 1999). This means we are able to take a potential long run relationship into 
account instead of only using differenced regressors. Estimation is based on dynamic fixed 
effects (DFE) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999) as a 
robustness check. While the DFE restricts all coefficients to be identical across countries, the 
PMG approach allows the short term parameters and the adjustment speed to be 
heterogeneous across countries, while the long run equilibrium relationship is assumed to be 
homogeneous. Thus the PMG estimator represents a compromise between allowing for cross 
country parameter heterogeneity on the one hand and keeping the number of model 
parameters small on the other hand.10 In order to determine the lag structure of the error 
correction model we apply a testing down procedure. First a fully specified model including 
contemporaneous as well as one-period lags of all short term effects is estimated. This 
corresponds to including 2 lags in level form. Starting from this general specification 
statistically insignificant short run effects are removed sequentially.  
The estimated coefficients from equation (2) cannot be interpreted in a causal way, as we 
cannot fully rule out the possibility that an omitted third factor drives the dependent variable 
as well as some of the regressors. Also we cannot fully rule out the issue of reverse causation 
between household debt and property prices. Nevertheless we think estimating equation (2) is 
a fruitful exercise for two reasons. First, there is empirical evidence supporting the notion that 
higher residential property prices drive up household borrowing (Jordà et al. 2015; Mian & 
Sufi 2011). In addition, against the background of stagnant income growth in most countries 
of our sample over the last two decades, we are not convinced that households’ optimistic 
expectations of future productivity and wage growth was the key driver of household debt 
accumulation omitted from our model. Second, any causal statement about the drivers of 
                                                 
10 For example estimating an unrestricted autoregressive distributed lag model 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(𝑝0, 𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑘) which 
allows estimates to be country specific with common lag length 𝑝, 𝑘 regressors and 𝑁 countries, requires to 
estimate 2𝑁 + (𝑝 + 1)𝑘𝑁 parameters. In contrast estimating the PMG version of that model only requires 2𝑁 +
𝑘(𝑝𝑁 + 1) parameters. With 11 countries, 5 regressors and 1 lag this amounts to 132 and 82 parameters, 
respectively. 
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household debt needs to be consistent with the patterns we find in the data. Therefore the 
reduced from regressions we present in this paper can be used to rule out explanations of 
household borrowing which are not consistent with the results. 
5 Determinants of Household Debt 
This section discusses the results from estimating equation (2), presented in Table 4. In 
columns (1) and (2) the top 1% income share is used as a measure of the income distribution 
while specifications (3) and (4) rely on a Gini coefficient. Furthermore columns (1) and (3) 
are based on DFE estimators while columns (2) and (4) are based on the PMG estimator as a 
robustness check. First, all four specifications exhibit a statistically significant adjustment 
towards the estimated long run trend. This indicates that there exists a cointegrating 
relationship. This result is further supported by carrying out panel unit root tests (Choi 2001) 
on the residuals (H0: 𝑟 = 𝐼(1)) from estimating equation (2) which lead to a rejection of the 
null hypothesis of unit roots in the residuals. The p-values from these unit root tests are 
provided at the bottom of Table 4. The long run trend is characterized by an income elasticity 
of 1 since the hypothesis of a unit elasticity (H0: 𝛽𝑦𝐷 = 1) is not rejected except in 
specification (4). This indicates that when holding the other explanatory variables constant, 
debt to income ratios remain stable. Conversely, rising debt to income ratios are explained by 
the remaining variables. Second, the long run residential property price elasticity is between 
0.41 and 0.62 and is highly statistically significant in all specifications. Thus there is a strong 
direct link between real estate prices and household borrowing, which is in line with the 
HBH. Third, the estimated long-run income distribution semi-elasticities are not consistent 
across specifications and are statistically insignificant in most cases. While the positive 
coefficient on the Gini in specification (4) is consistent with the ECH, status-induced 
household borrowing should be closely related to rising top incomes as debt-financed 
expenditure cascades would be triggered at the top of the distribution. It is important to point 
out that also the short run income distribution coefficients are not statistically significant, 
which is why they were dropped. Fourth, the long-run real interest rate semi-elasticity is 
statistically significant and negative at the 5% level in the DFE specifications. This finding is 
in line with the LIH, which predicts lower real interest rates coinciding with higher household 
debt levels. Fifth, the old-rage ratio is not a statistically significant predictor of household 
debt in most specifications and therefore is not included in later specifications. Only column 
(4) of Table 1 exhibits a statistically significant positive semi-elasticity of the old age ratio, 
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which however is not in line with a basic life-cycle interpretation. Finally the long run 
coefficient of the credit market regulation index is positive and highly statistically significant 
across all specifications. This latter finding is in line with the FDH which states that 
household debt expanded due to shifts in credit supply conditions as a result of a financial 
sector more willing to lend.  
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Table 4: Household debt, baseline specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DFE PMG DFE PMG 
log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  0.984*** 0.888*** 0.954*** 0.687*** 
 
(0.22) (0.11) (0.23) (0.07) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.414*** 0.570*** 0.426*** 0.622*** 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.15) (0.04) 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 -0.674 0.454 
  
 
(1.89) (0.75) 
  𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 
  
-0.169 3.438*** 
   
(1.07) (0.49) 
𝑅𝑡 -3.712** -0.601 -3.703** -0.421 
 
(1.50) (0.58) (1.49) (0.40) 
𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑡 0.34 0.977 0.27 5.996*** 
 
(1.74) (1.31) (1.88) (1.01) 
log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) 0.790*** 0.710*** 0.780*** 0.439*** 
 
(0.28) (0.16) (0.28) (0.08) 
short run 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
-0.061*** -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.075** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
∆ log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  0.169*** 0.156* 0.166*** 0.209** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
∆ log(𝑌𝑡−1
𝐷 )  -0.131** 
 
-0.125** 
 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 ∆ log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.216*** 0.189*** 0.213*** 0.166*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
∆ log(𝑃𝑃𝑡−1) -0.106*** 
 
-0.102*** 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 ∆𝑅𝑡 0.182*** 0.094 0.185*** 0.115** 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
∆ log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) -0.076*** -0.148*** -0.074*** -0.112*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡−1).  0.682*** 0.522*** 0.677*** 0.507*** 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.086 -0.048*** -0.066 -0.087** 
 
(0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.04) 
N 362 374 371 374 
H0: 𝑟 = 𝐼(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H0: 𝛽𝑦𝐷 = 1 0.94 0.32 0.84 0.00 
H0: 𝛽𝑃𝑃 = 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Error correction models estimated with Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) 
estimators. Dependent variable: ∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡). Stars indicate statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets. The bottom three lines of the table report p-values of hypothesis tests. H0: 
𝑟 = 𝐼(1) is the hypothesis that the residuals contain a unit root and H0: 𝛽𝑦𝐷 = 1 and H0: 𝛽𝑃𝑃 = 1 are the 
hypotheses that the long run elasticities for disposable income and property prices are equal to 1. 
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So overall Table 4 provides strong and robust support for the HBH as residential real estate 
price coefficients are highly statistical significant across all specifications. Equally robust is 
only the statistically positive elasticity of the credit market regulation index which supports 
the FDH. Finding negative interest rate coefficients is sensitive to the estimation method 
while positive coefficients of the income inequality measure are only found in 1 specification 
while they are statistically not significant in the others. This latter finding is not consistent 
with the ECH. 
The results of Table 4 are based on the assumption that household borrowing reacts to 
increases and decreases in property prices as well as top income shares in a symmetric way. 
However since the process of leveraging up, especially in an environment of general 
optimism, is easier than to deleverage, potentially in an economic downturn, such symmetric 
behaviour might not hold. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 5 provide a test for that 
assumption. We re-estimate the baseline model with an additional indicator variable (𝐼𝑃𝑃) 
which is equal to one in periods of declining or stagnating residential property prices. This 
dummy is then interacted with the measure of real residential property prices itself. Table 5 
shows the house price growth dummy itself as well as its interaction with property prices are 
not statistically significant. Thus we fail to find evidence supporting asymmetric responses of 
household borrowing to increasing and stagnant property prices. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 introduce the same dummy variable into the baseline model 
but interact it with the income distribution measures. The rationale is that if households are 
credit constrained, it might be the case that inequality induced borrowing only happens in 
periods of house price growth because rising property prices will ease the households’ credit 
constraints. However, neither the top income share specification in column (3) nor the Gini 
specification in column (4) supports this argument. In both cases the dummy for periods of 
house price growth and its interaction with the distribution measures are not statistically 
significant. Inequality induced household borrowing is not explicitly linked to periods of 
growing house prices. 
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Table 5: Household debt, housing boom and post crisis interactions 
 
dummy for periods of 
declining PP (𝐼𝑃𝑃) 
interacted with PP 
dummy for periods of 
declining PP (𝐼𝑃𝑃) inter. 
with Top1 and Gini 
post crisis dummy 
(2009-2011) (𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠) 
interacted with Top1 
and Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  DFE DFE DFE DFE DFE DFE 
log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  0.930*** 0.966*** 0.934*** 0.944*** 0.956*** 0.997*** 
 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.374*** 0.367** 0.413*** 0.432*** 0.408*** 0.445*** 
 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) x 
𝐼𝑃𝑃  0.142 0.154     
  
 
(0.11) (0.12)     
  𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 0.428   0.471   1.64 
 
 
(1.96)   (2.09)   (2.17) 
 𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡⁡x 𝐼
𝑃𝑃 
 
  0.161   
  
  
  (1.26)   
  𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.317   -0.281 
 
-0.255 
  
(1.01)   (1.04) 
 
(1.07) 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡⁡x 𝐼
𝑃𝑃 
 
    0.527 
  
  
    (0.92) 
  𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 x 𝐼
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠 
 
      -3.118* 
 
  
      (1.77) 
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 x 𝐼
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠 
 
      
 
-2.463 
  
      
 
(2.23) 
𝐼𝑃𝑃 0.04 0.045 -0.008 -0.231 
  
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.43) 
  𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠 
 
      0.239 1.125 
  
      (0.18) (1.07) 
𝑅𝑡 -3.502** -3.962*** -3.504** -3.955*** -3.560** -4.246*** 
 
(1.38) (1.39) (1.42) (1.42) (1.46) (1.53) 
log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) 0.821*** 0.818*** 0.819*** 0.794*** 0.652*** 0.710*** 
 
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) 
short run 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
-0.063*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.057*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 362 371 362 371 362 371 
H0: 𝑟 = 𝐼(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Error correction models estimated with Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimators. Dependent variable: 
∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡). Stars indicate statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets. 
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Despite the pronounced increase in top income shares over the last three decades in many 
OECD countries (Atkinson et al. 2011), we did not find measures of the distribution of 
income to be statistically significant predictors of household borrowing, neither in the long 
nor short run. In specifications (5) and (6) in Table 5 we define a post-crisis dummy (𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠) 
which is equal to one for the period 2009 to 2011 in order to test whether inequality induced 
debt accumulation was primarily a pre-crisis phenomenon. When interacting the post crisis 
dummy with the top income share and the Gini coefficient, neither the interaction nor the 
dummy nor the income distribution measures exhibit statistically significant semi-elasticities. 
The only exception is the interaction with the top income share in specification 5, which 
exhibits a negative coefficient, statistically different from 0 at the 10% level. Therefore, these 
interactions do not provide evidence for a positive link between higher income inequality and 
household borrowing and thus do not support the ECH.  
Importantly all specifications in Table 5 remain consistent with the baseline results from 
Table 4: The long-run income elasticity of household debt is not statistically different from 
one, the long-run coefficients on real property prices and the credit regulation index are 
positive and statistically significant while the real interest rate coefficients are statistically 
significant and negative. 
Table 6 presents three robustness checks. First, the ability of households to borrow might 
crucially depend on the development and state of the domestic financial sector. Countries 
with more developed financial sectors might exhibit higher levels of household sector 
indebtedness. In addition it may also be the case that borrowing is more sensitive to collateral 
values in more developed systems because financial institutions are (seemingly) better able to 
handle the risk of higher loan to income ratios. In addition a more sophisticated financial 
sector could be better at channelling the risks associated with uncollateralized borrowing for 
status expenditures to risk seeking investors. Thus debt-financed expenditure cascades should 
be more likely to happen in financially developed countries. In order to test these arguments 
we divide the sample into a group of countries with highly developed financial markets and a 
group of countries with less developed financial markets. In line with the literature (Law & 
Singh 2014) we choose domestic credit to the private sector relative to GDP as a proxy for 
financial development. Ranking countries based on this financial development measure in 
2005 yields a group of seven highly developed countries consisting of: Japan, United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Australia. The six less financially developed 
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countries in our samples are: Germany, Sweden, France, Norway, Italy, Finland and Belgium. 
In Table 6, specifications (1) and (2) are based on the first group and specifications (3) and 
(4) are based on the second group. The regressions based on the sample of countries with 
highly developed financial sectors exhibit statistically significant residential property price 
elasticities of 0.81 and 0.97 respectively. In comparison the long-run property price 
elasticities of household borrowing in the sample of countries with less developed financial 
sectors are only 0.37. While the standard errors especially for the first set of results are large, 
this pattern is consistent with collateral playing a more important role in higher developed 
financial markets where it is easier to re-mortgage and benefit from increasing property 
prices. However the results in specifications (1) to (4) do not support the notion that status 
induced borrowing is more likely to occur with more developed financial markets. The latter 
group of countries with more developed financial markets does not report statistically 
significant coefficients of the income distribution measures. Overall this sample split shows 
important differences between the two groups but still supports the main findings from the 
previous specifications: there is a statistically highly significant link between household 
borrowing and residential property prices as well as credit deregulation and low interest rates. 
There is no evidence of a positive link between higher measures of income inequality and 
household borrowing.  
Table 6: Robustness checks 
 
high financial 
development 
low financial 
development lagged PP no PP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log(𝑌𝑡
𝐷)  1.150* 0.837 1.077*** 1.092*** 1.159*** 1.448*** 
 
(0.66) (0.64) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.19) 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑡) 0.814** 0.968** 0.373*** 0.372**   
 
 
(0.37) (0.43) (0.14) (0.16)   
 log(𝑃𝑃𝑡−1) 
 
  
 
  0.292*** 
 
  
  
 
  (0.11) 
 𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡 -0.59   -4.779**   -0.843 -1.845 
 
(4.32)   (2.43)   (1.66) (2.00) 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 
 
0.723 
 
-1.575   
 
  
(2.32) 
 
(1.54)   
 𝑅𝑡 4.744 4.815 -4.640*** -3.297** -4.904*** -4.952*** 
 
(4.40) (4.64) (1.59) (1.33) (1.46) (1.39) 
log(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡) 1.487* 1.48 1.137*** 1.035*** 0.831*** 0.854*** 
 
(0.89) (1.07) (0.28) (0.30) (0.20) (0.24) 
short run 
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𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
-0.037** -0.035* -0.079*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.064*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 137 141 171 174 349 362 
Error correction models estimated with Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimators. Dependent variable: 
∆ log(𝐷𝑖𝑡). Stars indicate statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Lower case letters indicate 
variables are transformed by taking natural logarithms. Standard errors in brackets. 
A possible objection to our specification is that there may be an endogeneity problem due to 
inverse causation between property prices and household debt. While there is considerable 
evidence that higher property prices boost household borrowing (Rubaszek & Serwa 2014; 
Mian & Sufi 2011; Goodhart & Hofmann 2008), it might also be the case that additional 
household borrowing leads to higher demand for residential real estate and given that supply 
is inelastic, to higher property prices. Specification (5) of Table 6 presents a simple check 
whether such a reverse link distorts our results: only lagged values of property prices are used 
in the regression. Results are similar, but the estimated long-run property price elasticity of 
household debt is 0.29 (compared to 0.41 with contemporaneous property price effects, 
specification (1) in Table 4). This supports our argument that property prices are a key driver 
of household debt accumulation. Notably, all of the key results of the baseline specification 
are qualitatively similar: the top income share coefficient remains statistically insignificant, 
the real interest rate coefficients remain statistically significant and negative and the 
coefficient on the credit regulation index is significant and positive.  
In a final robustness check we assess whether higher inequality might work through the real 
estate market. Several of our explanatory variables might also push up property prices. For 
example, if the residence were the main item for social status comparison, then increasing 
income inequality might be triggering a debt-financed cascade of house purchases which 
could lead to increasing property prices if supply is inelastic. In order to allow for such a 
mechanism we drop residential property prices from the regression in order to allow the 
distribution of income to vary independently of property prices. Specification (6) of Table 6 
clearly does not support such an argument. The coefficient on the top income share remains 
statistically insignificant but the disposable income coefficient increases to 1.45 which 
emphasizes the important role of the housing market: Without taking property prices into 
account the model predicts implausible, because unsustainable, long run income elasticities 
above unity.  
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Overall, the robustness checks support the main findings in the baseline specification. First, 
the long run income elasticity of household debt is statistically not different from one which 
indicates that holding factors such as property prices, interest rates and credit regulation 
constant, long run debt to income ratios remain stable. Second, real residential property prices 
exhibit a statistically highly significant positive long run coefficient. This finding is 
extremely robust across specifications and is consistent with the HBH. Third, top income 
shares and Gini coefficients do not exhibit statistically significant coefficients in most 
specifications. In particular the data does not support a positive link between the distribution 
of income and household borrowing as predicted by the ECH, neither in the group of 
countries with highly developed financial markets nor in a specification without property 
prices. Fourth, real interest rates and the credit regulation index exhibit statistically 
significant negative and positive elasticities, respectively. These findings are robust across 
specifications and are in line with the LIH and the FDH, respectively.  
While the signs of the estimated long run elasticities allow us to draw some conclusions 
about the explanatory power of the different hypotheses, the economic significance is crucial 
when it comes to assessing the relative importance of competing explanations. We want to 
compare the contribution of the different independent variables to changes in household debt 
over the 1995-2007 period. This will allow us to determine which of the three hypotheses 
consistent with our results (HBH, LIH, FDH) is most relevant for predicting household debt 
in the pre-crisis period. For that purpose cross section averages are taken of all series, after 
transforming monetary series into chained purchasing power parity 2005 dollars. Then 
predicted changes in debt to income ratios are computed based on the long run estimates 
obtained from DFE and PMG estimators. The method is described in detail in Appendix B, 
results are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7: Contributions to changes in household debt to income ratios between 1995 and 2007 
  
actual change 
in 𝐷/𝑌𝐷 
predicted 
change in 
𝐷/𝑌𝐷 
𝑌𝐷 𝑃𝑃 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 𝑅 𝑂𝐿𝐷 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 
DFE 44% 33% -2% 19% -1% 11% 1% 3% 
PMG 44% 33% -4% 27% 2% 2% 2% 3% 
The predicted change in debt is computed based on equation (5). Contributions of individual variables are 
computed equivalent to equation (7). Calculations used the estimated coefficients from columns 1 (DFE) and 2 
(PMG) in Table 4. Results were obtained by taking GDP weighted averages across countries after transforming 
monetary series into constant 2005 purchasing parity dollars. The product of the individual change factors yields 
the predicted change in 𝐷/𝑌𝐷. 
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Five results emerge from Table 7: First, household debt grows almost directly in proportion 
to disposable income when all other factors are held constant. This result is reflected by the 
fact that the contribution of disposable income to changes in the debt to income ratio over the 
1995-2007 period is very small and slightly negative at -2% and -4%, depending on the 
estimator. Second, real appreciations of residential property prices explain between 19% and 
27% of the change in household debt to income ratios, ceteris paribus. This result supports 
the HBH which predicts that the main driver of debt to income ratios were strongly 
increasing real estate prices. The different contributions of 19% and 27% reflect differences 
in the DFE and PMG estimates. As can be seen in Table 4 the DFE specification exhibits a 
long run property price elasticity of 0.41 compared to 0.57 in the PMG specification. Third, 
the top income share is not very useful in predicting debt to income ratios. The ECH is not 
supported by the data. Fourth, real interest rates, explain about a third of the increase in debt 
to income ratios when using the DFE estimator. Fifth, demographic shifts and changes in 
credit market regulation played a negligible role for household borrowing outcomes 
according to the estimated model. Overall residential real estate prices stand out as the most 
important predictor of household debt to income ratios. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the explanatory power of rising income inequality, growing property 
prices, low interest rates and financial deregulation as causes of rising household debt by 
estimating a debt accumulation equation for a panel of 11 OECD countries spanning from 
1980 to 2011. While we are not able to give a causal interpretation to our findings, any causal 
claim about the determining factors of household sector debt needs to be consistent with the 
patterns we find. It is in this spirit that we interpret our results. First, we find that real 
residential property prices are the single most important predictor of aggregate household 
debt to income ratios. Over the 1995 to 2007 period they explain between 19% and 27% out 
of the total 44% increase in the panel averaged debt to income ratio which is consistent with 
the prediction of the housing boom hypothesis. Since real estate is the most significant asset 
type for the vast majority of households in OECD countries, this is a highly plausible but 
often underappreciated result. Second, we fail to find a robust statistically significant 
relationship between income inequality measures and household debt. Using the top 1% 
income share as well as a Gini coefficient, we do neither find a robust positive nor negative 
relationship. This is not consistent with the expenditure cascades hypothesis. Third, the 
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second most important predictor of household debt to income ratios are low interest rates 
which often show statistically significant coefficients, however are sensitive to estimator 
choice. For the 1995 to 2007 period real interest rates explain between 11% and 2% out of the 
total 44% increase in the panel averaged debt to income ratio, consistent with the low interest 
rate hypothesis. Finally we find that financial deregulation is a robust predictor of household 
borrowing, however the size of this effect is limited with an explained increase of the 
aggregate debt to income ratio of 3% between 1995 and 2007. This low predictive power 
reflects the fact that our measure is a credit regulation index that does not capture changing 
practices in the financial industry which potentially played a more important role such as 
changes in risk appetite and lending practices. 
Our results endorse a view that regards household debt as an outcome primarily of real estate 
transactions, supported by loose monetary policy and financial regulation while the 
distribution of income only plays a minor role in explaining household indebtedness. Thus 
macroeconomic models that aim at explaining household debt should explicitly model real 
estate prices. When it comes to developing models for studying the emergence of debt-fuelled 
bubbles, ignoring the housing market is strikingly inconsistent with macroeconomic stylized 
facts. This does imply a word of caution towards the enthusiasm with which 
macroeconomists (Frank et al. 2014; Kapeller & Schütz 2014; Belabed et al. 2013) have 
embraced upward-looking consumption norms. 
With respect to the existing macroeconometric panel literature which investigates the drivers 
of private sector borrowing, we confirm the previous finding that real house prices are the 
most important predictor of household sector debt levels. In contrast we fail to find evidence 
for a positive link between an increasingly polarized distribution of income and household 
indebtedness as reported by several authors (Behringer & Treeck 2013; Gu & Huang 2014; 
Kumhof et al. 2012; Klein 2015; Malinen 2014; Perugini et al. 2016). We think our paper is 
different in three key aspects which explain the differences in the results. First, none of these 
papers controls for the impact of property prices and thus face a potentially sever omitted 
variable problem. Second, many of them analyse the determinants of private sector debt, 
including the non-financial corporate sector, instead of the household sector. Third, only 
Kumhof et al. (2012) estimate fully specified, in contrast to bivariate, cointegration 
relationships which suffer from omitted variable problems 
25 
 
This paper has taken a reduced-form approach, which allowed us to use panel data. Future 
research should distinguish between credit supply and credit demand. The difficulty of 
finding appropriate instruments for shifts in the credit supply for a broad set of countries, will 
make a time series approach attractive for such an exercise. Furthermore future analysis 
should address the endogenous nature of the involved variables, which lends itself to a 
systems approach. Disposable income, interest rates, house prices and credit all interact with 
each other and thus it might be worth to trade off degrees of freedom to model these 
interactions and to assess the robustness of the results. Theoretically, our findings suggest the 
need to develop theoretical models that allow for boom bust cycles in real estate prices and 
household debt. 
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Appendix A: Definitions, descriptive statistics and unit root tests 
 
Table A1. Data definitions and sources 
abbreviatio
n 
full variable name unit source 
YD Disposable real gross income, 
household sector (deflated using PC) 
national 
currency, 
billion 
AMECO 
PC Price deflator private final consumption 
expenditure (PCPH) 
2005=1 AMECO 
R Real long-term interest rates, deflator 
GDP 
% AMECO and OECD 
(MEI) 
OLD 
Fraction of population aged 65 and 
older % 
AMECO 
D Total credit to the household sector 
(deflated using PC) 
national 
currency, 
billion 
BIS 
TOP1 Top 1% income share of the SWIID  % SWIID v4 
GINI Gini coefficient (pre tax and post 
transfer) of the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database   
SWIID v5 
PP Real property prices BIS (exact 
definitions vary across countries, 
deflated using PC) 
2005=1 BIS 
SP Share price index (deflated using PC) 2005=1 IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
and OECD (MEI) 
CRED Fraser Index, Subcategory 5A Credit 
Regulation: percentage of privately 
held deposits (higher values higher 
percentage), interest rate controls 
(market rates and positive real rates 
result in higher values), private sector 
credit (higher values less gov 
borrowing) 
index between 
[0,10] 
Fraser Institute 
FIN Index of financial reforms measuring: 
credit controls, interest rate controls, 
entry barriers, state ownership in 
banking, capital account restrictions, 
supervision of the banking sector and 
securities market policy. Policies in 
each of these 7 areas are awarded a 
number of 0 to 3 where higher 
numbers represent liberal policies. 
index between 
[1,21] 
IMF (Abiad et al. 
2008 - A New 
Database of 
Financial Reforms) 
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Table A2. Data summary statistics I 
Variable   Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Observations 
DH/YD overall 0.90 0.40 0.15 2.44 N 418 
 
between 
 
0.33 0.33 1.61 n 13 
  within   0.26 0.12 1.73 T-bar 32.2 
PC overall 0.86 0.20 0.23 1.26 N 418 
 
between 
 
0.06 0.76 0.98 n 13 
  within   0.20 0.33 1.28 T-bar 32.2 
R overall 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.12 N 400 
 
between 
 
0.00 0.03 0.04 n 13 
  within   0.02 -0.07 0.13 T 30.8 
OLD overall 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.24 N 407 
 
between 
 
0.02 0.12 0.17 n 13 
  within   0.02 0.08 0.23 T 31.3 
TOP1 overall 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.18 N 393 
 
between 
 
0.03 0.05 0.14 n 13 
  within   0.02 0.03 0.18 T 30.2 
GINI overall 0.45 0.05 0.29 0.55 N 406 
 
between 
 
0.03 0.39 0.53 n 13 
  within   0.03 0.35 0.53 T-bar 31.2 
PP overall 0.82 0.27 0.40 1.61 N 418 
 
between 
 
0.15 0.62 1.19 n 13 
  within   0.23 0.44 1.49 T-bar 32.2 
CRED overall 8.83 1.04 5.00 10.00 N 406 
 
between 
 
0.73 7.17 9.61 n 13 
  within   0.75 6.28 11.07 T 31.2 
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Table A3: Unit root tests, first differenced series 
  P L Z deterministic part 
dh 0.70 0.61 0.61 trend and constant 
yd 0.00 0.01 0.01 trend and constant 
pp 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
TOP1 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
GINI 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
OLD 0.69 0.98 0.97 trend and constant 
CRED 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 trend and constant 
dh 0.07 0.05 0.05 constant 
yd 0.25 0.17 0.15 constant 
pp 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
TOP1 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
GINI 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
OLD 0.26 0.89 0.86 constant 
CRED 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 constant 
Panel unit root tests (H0: all series contain unit roots) based on Choi (2001) who uses the following labels: 
inverse chi-square test (P), inverse normal test (Z) and logit test (L). P-values from ADF tests with 3 lags are 
combined. Lower case letters indicate variables are transformed by taking natural logarithms.  
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Appendix B: Deriving effect size computations 
This appendix describes how the results for Table 7 are obtained. These effect size 
computations are based on the estimated long run elasticities. Taking the difference of the 
predicted dependent variable between 2007 and 1995 gives the predicted growth rate in that 
period. Equivalently the difference can also be expressed in terms of the independent 
variables according to the following equation:   
log (
?̂?2007
?̂?1995
) = 𝜃1 log (
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 ) + 𝜃2 log (
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
) + 𝜃3(𝑄2007 − 𝑄1995) 
+𝜃4(𝑅2007 − 𝑅1995) + 𝜃5(𝑂𝐿𝐷2007 − 𝑂𝐿𝐷1995) + 𝜃6 log (
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷2007
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷1995
) 
(A1) 
For equation (A1) all series are aggregated by taking GDP weighted cross section averages 
after transforming monetary series into chained purchasing power parity 2005 Dollars. ?̂?2007 
and ?̂?1995 represent the predicted long run debt levels in 2007 and 1995 based on these 
averaged series and the estimated long run coefficients. After some manipulation equation 
(A1) becomes: 
?̂?2007
?̂?1995
= (
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 )
?̂?1
(
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
)
?̂?2
𝑒?̂?3(𝑄2007−𝑄1995)𝑒?̂?4(𝑅2007−𝑅1995)𝑒?̂?5(𝑂𝐿𝐷2007−𝑂𝐿𝐷1995) (
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷2007
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷1995
)
?̂?6
 (A2) 
In order to obtain a change in debt to income ratios equation A2 can be transformed: 
?̂?2007
𝑌2007
𝐷
?̂?1995
𝑌1995
𝐷
=
(
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 )
(?̂?1−1)
(
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
)
?̂?2
𝑒?̂?3(𝑄2007−𝑄1995)𝑒?̂?4(𝑅2007−𝑅1995)𝑒?̂?5(𝑂𝐿𝐷2007−𝑂𝐿𝐷1995) (
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷2007
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷1995
)
?̂?6
 (A3) 
From equation (A3) each variable’s contribution to the predicted change in household debt to 
income ratios between 1995 and 2007 can be defined. For example in the case of disposable 
household income itself as well as property prices these contributions are:  
?̂?2007
𝑌2007
𝐷
?̂?1995
𝑌1995
𝐷
⁄ = (
𝑌2007
𝐷
𝑌1995
𝐷 )
(?̂?1−1)
    (A4) 
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?̂?2007
𝑌2007
𝐷
?̂?1995
𝑌1995
𝐷
⁄ = (
𝑃𝑃2007
𝑃𝑃1995
)
?̂?2
     (A5) 
The contributions to changes in household debt to income ratios between 2007 and 1995 for 
all variables are presented in Table 7. Results are presented based on DFE and PMG 
estimates, from columns 1 and 2 in Table 4, respectively. 
 
